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THE ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
It is sometimes suggested that there is a sharp opposition be-
tween "liberty" and "equality."1 If the law forbids racial discrimi-
nation in employment, it may promote equality, but perhaps it will 
simultaneously interfere with liberty. If the law requires wealthy 
people to transfer some of their income to poor people, it may pro-
mote equality, but it may also undermine liberty. If a health care 
program ensures universal access to health care, it may promote 
equality, but it could also raise serious doubts from the standpoint 
of liberty. The tension between liberty and equality often appears 
deep, and it plays a large role in American political and legal 
thought. 
But before accepting the alleged opposition between liberty and 
equality, we should observe that there are many possible under-
standings of liberty and equality. These understandings reveal not 
disputes about dictionary definitions but diverse substantive judg-
ments that need to be identified and assessed. Different concep-
tions of the two values will lead to different views about their 
relationship. For example, the term equality could refer to freedom 
from desperate conditions, in the form of minimum welfare guaran-
tees; to a ban on discrimination on certain specified grounds; to the 
idea that every citizen should have the same power over political 
outcomes, as in the one-person, one-vote rule; to similar starting 
points or basic opportunities for every citizen; to similar incomes or 
wealth; to similar incomes unless disparities can be justified as ben-
eficial for all; or to much more. 
The same is true for liberty. That capacious term could refer to 
the basic political rights of free speech and free elections. It could 
include the guarantees of a fair system of criminal justice, in which 
rules are laid down in advance and a defendant has a right to a fair 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago. - Ed. This es· 
say develops some ideas contained elsewhere. See CASS R. SuNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CoNSTl· 
TUTION 338-46 (1993). The essay greatly benefited from comments by Akhil Amar, Martha 
Minow, and others at a conference on equal citizenship held at Brown University in March 
1994. I am also grateful for very helpful suggestions from Richard Epstein, Jane Mansbridge, 
and Susan Moller Okin. 
1. See the helpful discussion in AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 12-30 (1992), 
upon which I draw here. 
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trial before an independent judge. It could entail social respect for 
the outcomes of processes in which citizens pursue their various 
conceptions of the good, given market forces, existing common law 
rules, existing preferences, and existing distributions of wealth. The 
term liberty could refer to a system that ensures autonomy in the 
formation of preferences and beliefs by providing a decent educa-
tion for all and by counteracting unjust background conditions. It 
could refer to much more. 
We can readily see that some conceptions of equality are quite 
compatible with - indeed identical to - some conceptions of lib-
erty. For example, libertarians, who may appear to oppose equal-
ity, insist on equality of an important kind; they want to ensure that 
all citizens have an equal right to pursue their own ends.2 An un-
derstanding of equality lies at the heart of the libertarian creed. 
Freedom from desperate conditions, often treated as an egalitarian 
idea, is an understanding of liberty as well. Those who emphasize 
autonomy in the formation of preferences are speaking of both 
equality and liberty; they want to ensure that unjustified inequali-
ties - inequalities based upon wealth, race, or sex, for example -
do not limit the free development of individual personality. 
In these circumstances, it is important to be quite careful before 
seeing any tension between equality and liberty. Tension exists 
only when we specify conceptions of these broad terms that cannot 
peacefully coexist. Perhaps such incompatible conceptions cannot 
be defended. Perhaps the best conceptions of equality are entirely 
compatible with the best understandings of liberty. 
In this essay, I seek to defend a particular understanding of 
equality, one that is an understanding of liberty as well. I call this 
conception "the anticaste principle."3 Put too briefly, the anticaste 
principle forbids social and legal practices from translating highly 
visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disad-
vantage, unless there is a very good reason for society to do so. On 
this view, a special problem of inequality arises when members of a 
group suffer from a range of disadvantages because of a group-
based characteristic that is both visible for all to see and irrelevant 
2. See id. at 22 (arguing that libertarians "insist[] on equal immunity from interference by 
others"). 
3. Related ideas can be found in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LA w § 16-21 (2d ed. 1988), and Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 
PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 107, 147-70 (1976). There are, however, important differences between 
these approaches and what I defend here, partly because of my understanding of the equality 
principle, and partly because I suggest that the principle is for legislative rather than judicial 
enforcement. Many such differences will emerge in the course of the discussion. 
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from a moral point of view. This form of inequality is likely to be 
unusually persistent and to extend into multiple social spheres, in-
deed into the interstices of everyday life. 
I do not claim that this is the only valid understanding of equal-
ity. On the contrary, there are many such understandings. Our 
Constitution's equality principle is plural rather than singular. It 
has numerous manifestations;4 a unitary conception of equality 
would not exhaust the term as it operates in American legal and 
political discussion. Consider political equality and principles disal-
lowing discrimination on the basis of religious conviction or preju-
dice. These conceptions of equality warrant support, and they have 
considerable grounding in our constitutional traditions.5 
I emphasize the anticaste principle, not because it exhausts the 
concept of equality, but because it captures an understanding that 
has strong roots in American legal traditions, has considerable in-
dependent appeal, is violated in many important parts of American 
life, and fits well with the best understandings of liberty. In other 
words, the anticaste principle is an important and perhaps insuffi-
ciently appreciated part of the lawyer's conception of equality 
under the American Constitution.6 
In describing the anticaste principle, I also offer some informa-
tion about racial and gender disparities in the United States. I do 
so because it is hard to have a sense of the world of discrimination 
without having a good sense of the data. Legal discussions about 
equality are too often and too exclusively conceptual, attempting to 
offer perspicuous descriptions of discrimination or inequality with-
out a sufficient discussion of the facts that underlie either the prob-
lem or the solutions.7 I will not offer much detail about solutions 
here, but I do hope that my presentation of information about ex-
isting inequalities will help to illuminate the problem. 
I emphasize as well that enforcement of the anticaste principle is 
mostly for legislative and executive officers and only secondarily for 
courts. Sometime in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, there was a large-scale transformation in the substance of the 
constitutional equality principle. This is a long and as-yet-untold 
4. In this way it is similar to most constitutional rights, which serve a number of functions. 
5. Some are discussed in SuNSTEIN, supra note *, at 123-61. 
6. Although this is a lawyer's conception, it is mostly for nonjudicial enforcement. See 
infra section 11.B.2. 
7. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, (Feb. 28, 1994) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the need for data and midlevel 
solutions in feminist reform of criminal law). 
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story. A set of amendments originally designed at least in part to 
eliminate social caste eventually became a requirement that legisla-
tion be reasonably related to legitimate state interests - a require-
ment whose original home was the Due Process Clause.8 The 
transformation makes some sense if we think about the limited ca-
pacities of the judiciary. Taken seriously, a full-blown anticaste 
principle is beyond judicial competence. But if the Constitution 
speaks to nonjudicial actors as well, the broad commitments of the 
Fourteenth Amendment have a different meaning outside the 
courtroom. It is possible, in short, to insist on the continuing im-
portance of one of the great unused provisions of the Constitution, 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment: "The Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article. "9 
I. FALSE STARTS 
In this Part, I discuss three understandings of the equality prin-
ciple. All three have played a major role in public and sometimes 
legal debate. The first stresses the advantages of free markets. The 
second relies on respect for existing preferences. The third and 
most important sees the equality principle as a ban on unreasonable 
distinctions between social groups. As we will see, the difficulties 
with each of these understandings help lay the foundation for the 
anticaste principle. 
A. Markets? 
In light of the extraordinary recent outburst of international en-
thusiasm for free markets, it should not be surprising to find a re-
surgence of the view that all invidious discrimination on the basis of 
race and sex will be eliminated by laissez faire.10 On this view, the 
appropriate approach for law would be to eliminate constraints on 
market ordering and to rely solely on property rights, voluntary ar-
rangements, and freedom of contract to produce equality. 
8. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 
(1897) (striking down a Louisiana law limiting the right of out-of-state insurance companies 
to do business in Louisiana as an infringement on liberty of contract not justified by the law's 
purpose). 
9. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
10. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 59-78 {1992). But see id. at 76 
(conceding that discrimination of some sort will persist in markets because such discrimina-
tion is "rational"). I focus on race and gender equality, with occasional reference to disabil-
ity. Other forms of inequality raise additional issues that I cannot take up here. See infra 
section II.B.4. 
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In many ways, free markets are indeed connected with equality 
on the basis of race and sex. Legal barriers to female and black 
employment are a form of government intervention in the market, 
and they have often been an effective and severe hindrance to 
equality. Antifemale and antiblack cartels, especially when govern-
ment-sponsored, can drive down both wages and employment for 
women and blacks. In a free market, by contrast, all people should 
succeed to the extent that they are able to perform their respective 
functions - as employers, employees, co-workers, and customers. 
It is unnecessary to stress that women and blacks often perform as 
well as or better than men and whites. Once discriminatory laws 
are eliminated, free markets may therefore accomplish a great deal 
in breaking down a system of inequality. In South Africa, for exam-
ple, it is most doubtful that the system of apartheid could have sur-
vived under free markets. Too many employers would have found 
it desirable to hire blacks; too many companies would have found it 
in their economic interest to serve people on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. 
The point can be made through a simple example. Suppose that 
an employer prefers to hire only men; suppose he believes that 
women belong in the home. This employer should face severe ob-
stacles to continued profitability and, in the end, might even be 
driven out of the market. An employer who restricts himself to one 
social group will be placed at a serious disadvantage; it would be as 
if he refuses to hire people whose last names begin with a particular 
letter. If the employer is sexist or racist, his "taste" for discrimina-
tion operates as an implicit tax on the operation of his business. To 
say the least, self-imposed implicit taxes are self-defeating in a com-
petitive market. 
Much the same can be said for a company that prefers to serve 
only whites or men. Such a company will artificially restrict its busi-
ness to one social group, and it will thus impair its own economic 
interests by reducing its market and the. corresponding demand for 
its product. An employer who hires and serves women as well as 
men should do much better in market competition. 
As a complete solution, however, free markets will be inade-
quate if used to remedy sex and race discrimination. There are sev-
eral reasons.11 First, a market system allows discriminatorily 
motivated third parties to impose costs on people who agree to 
11. A more detailed discussion, with citations, can be found in Cass R. Sunstein, Why 
Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 22, 23-34 (1991). 
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treat men and women, or blacks and whites, equally.12 Customers, 
co-workers, and others sometimes withdraw patronage and services 
from nondiscriminatory employers. For example, a law firm that 
hires female lawyers might find itself punished in the marketplace. 
A grocery store that hires blacks might find it harder to attract cus-
tomers. Under these circumstances, market pressures do not check 
discrimination but instead increase the likelihood that it will con-
tinue. Ironically, the failure to discriminate operates as a tax on the 
employer's business, rather than vice versa. A nondiscriminator 
could face the equivalent of a self-imposed tax by virtue of co-
worker or customer reactions. 
The phenomenon is hardly unusual. Consider, for example, a 
shopkeeper whose customers do not like dealing with blacks or 
women; a commercial airline whose patrons react unfavorably to 
female pilots; a university whose students and alumni prefer a pri-
marily white faculty; a hospital whose patients are uncomfortable 
with female doctors or black nurses. The persistence of private seg-
regation in major league baseball is a familiar example. The latter 
finds a modern analogue in studies of the prices of baseball cards, 
which show a race-based premium for white players.13 We may 
speculate that in some athletic competitions customers prefer white 
athletes, and these preferences play a role in some market deci-
sions. In cases of this kind, market pressures create rather than pre-
vent discrimination.14 
Of course, third parties do not have uniform preferences. Many 
and perhaps most whites and men are not discriminators. In any 
case third-party preferences are sharply divided, and for this reason 
we should expect a wide range of diverse views and practices, each 
gaining and losing influence in different times and places.15 My 
point is only that in some important sectors, and for important 
lengths of time, the existence of third-party discrimination can en-
12. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF, The economics of the caste and of the rat race and other 
woeful tales, in AN ECONOMIST'S BOOK OF TALES 23, 31-43 {1984). 
13. See Clark Nardinelli & Curtis Simon, Customer Racial Discrimination in the Market 
for Memorabilia: The Case of Baseball, 105 QJ. EcoN. 575 (1990). 
14. On this account it remains necessary to explain why third parties are not themselves 
hurt by their taste. Sometimes they will be; an employee who prefers not to work with 
women may find himself with a worse job. But sometimes the third parties will not suffer 
competitive injuries in markets because they are not competing in markets - consider peo-
ple who prefer not to fly in airplanes piloted by blacks - and sometimes the harm inflicted . 
by a discriminatory taste will operate like any other harm inflicted by a taste, for example, 
the taste for color television or high-quality ice cream. Prices will go up, but the relevant 
goods will not be driven from the market. 
15. The point is emphasized in EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 30-31, 44-46. 
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sure that inequality persists even in free markets. The extent of the 
effect is of course an empirical question. 
Thus far, then, we have seen that co-worker and customer dis-
crimination may lead markets to perpetuate discrimination. A sec-
ond problem with relying on markets to produce equality is that 
race and sex discrimination can be a successful and indeed ordinary 
market response to generalizations or stereotypes that, although 
overbroad and perhaps in one sense even invidious, provide an eco-
nomically rational basis for market decisions.16 If stereotypes are 
economically rational, the market will not operate against them. 
Stereotypes and generalizations are of course a cominon ingredient 
in market decisions. There are information costs in making distinc-
tions within categories, and people sometimes make the category 
do the work of a more individualized and perhaps more costly ex-
amination into the merits of the particular employee. 
Many categorical judgments are not only pervasive but also le-
gitimate. We all rely on them every day. Employers rely on proxies 
of various kinds, even though the proxies are overbroad generaliza-
tions and far from entirely accurate. Test scores, level of education, 
and prestige of college attended are all part of rational employment 
decisions. Despite their imprecision, such categorical judgments 
might well be efficient as a cost-saving device and thus persist in 
free markets; but they might also disserve the cause of equality on 
the basis of race and gender. 
This is so especially in light of the fact that race and gender are 
so highly visible and thus so cheaply used as a proxy for other 
things.17 Different characteristics - for example, educational at-
tainment - might be more accurate as proxies but less efficient to 
use because the cost of gaining accurate information is higher. 
We might compare statistical generalizations of the sort I am 
describing with the category of prejudice. Perhaps we can under-
stand that controversial term to include a continuum of unnecessary 
or inefficient categorical judgments, including, for example, (i) a be-
lief that members of a group have certain characteristics when in 
fact they do not, (ii) a belief that many or most members of a group 
have certain characteristics when in fact only some or a few do, and 
(iii) a reliance on fairly accurate group-based generalizations when 
16. See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 659 (1972). 
17. The point is, of course, related to the discussion of why a morally irrelevant character-
istic should be highly visible in order to be part of a caste system. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 70-75. 
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more accurate and reasonably cheap classifying devices are avail-
able, or, in other words, when there is a more efficient classifying 
device. Statistical discrimination is quite different. It occurs when 
the generalization, though inaccurate, is less costly to use than any 
subclassifying device, even though subclassifications would be more 
accurate in particular cases. Under plausible assumptions about the 
cost of acquiring information, statistical discrimination might well 
be efficient. 
Reliance on race- or sex-based generalizations may be a product 
of prejudice, but this need not be the case. Generalizations about 
race and gender may well be overbroad, but no more so than gener-
alizations that are typically and unproblematically used in many 
areas of decision. Note that "college attended" might well be used 
in the employment market, despite its considerable imprecision as a 
classifying device. Moreover, in the area of sex discrimination, an 
employer might discriminate against women, not because he hates 
or devalues them, but because he has found from experience that 
women devote more time to child care than do men, or that women 
are more likely to take leave for domestic duties. For this reason 
sex discrimination might be based on genuine facts, not irrational 
prejudice - although those facts may themselves be a product of 
discrimination elsewhere, particularly within the family.18 This 
form of statistical discrimination - judgments based on statistically 
reasonable stereotyping - need not be a form of prejudice. 
My point here is not to celebrate or to condemn statistical dis-
crimination but instead to say that economically rational decisions 
can ensure that inequality will persist for women or blacks, even or 
perhaps especially in free markets. In various ways, blacks differ 
from whites and women differ from men. In light of these differ-
ences, it is fully possible that in certain settings, race- or sex-based 
generalizations are sufficiently accurate as proxies for certain char-
acteristics. The conclusion is that free markets will not drive out 
discrimination to the extent that discrimination is an efficient use of 
generalizations that, while inaccurate in some ways, have sufficient 
accuracy to persist as classificatory devices. 
This point suggests that there is no sharp discontinuity between 
laws calling for affirmative action and laws embodying the antidis-
crimination principle, at least if the outlawed discrimination is a 
form of statistical discrimination. The ban on statistical discrimina-
18. See SusAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 110-33 (1989) (arguing that 
the family as currently constituted "raises psychological as well as practical barriers against 
women in all other spheres"). 
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tion shows that the law does not just forbid irrational bigotry or 
prejudice. Instead, the most elementary antidiscrimination princi-
ple singles out one kind of economically rational stereotyping and 
condemns it, on the theory that such stereotyping has the harmful 
long-term consequence of perpetuating group-based inequalities. 
Along this dimension, the distinction between affirmative action 
and antidiscrimination is thin in principle.19 It is thin because the 
law does not only ban discrimination rooted in prejudice or hostil-
ity; it also bans discrimination in the form of statistical generaliza-
tions of the sort that employers, customers, and others rely on all 
the time. The ban on statistical discrimination is based on many of 
the reasons that support affirmative action. I do not contend that 
the two are the same thing. 
Thus far, then, we have seen that markets are unlikely to bring 
about equality on the basis of race and sex when third parties are in 
a position to impose costs on nondiscriminators and when statistical 
discrimination is rational. The third problem with relying on laissez 
faire to eliminate discrimination is that in free markets, people who 
are subject to discrimination may fail to attempt to overcome their 
unequal status because they will fail to invest in "human capital" -
the time and effort, in terms of education and experience, needed to 
produce economically valued characteristics. They may fail to do so 
simply because of current social practices and a discriminatory sta-
tus quo. Suppose, for example, that there is current sex discrimina-
tion in a certain field for any number of reasons - employers 
themselves prefer to hire male employees, or third parties impose 
pressures in discriminatory directions, or employers engage in sta-
tistical discrimination. These discriminatory phenomena will affect 
the decisions of women with regard to education or training in the 
relevant field and indeed may affect their aspirations in general. As 
market participants, women might well invest less than men in 
training to be, for example, doctors or technicians, if these profes-
sions discriminate against women and thus reward their investments 
less than those of men. The decision to invest less would be fully 
rational as a response to the practices of employers.20 
19. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SuP. CT. REv. 99 (arguing 
that insistence on nondiscrimination in fact amounts to affirmative action when racial classifi· 
cations are accurate). 
20. Notably, this is a form of market failure, unlike the first two problems. The lower 
investments in human capital will produce externalities. See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard 
Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 13 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 340 (1983) (producing a model in which workers with similar initial capabilities 
end up with different amounts of human capital according to how much employers are willing 
to pay different groups of workers). 
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Of course the same would be true in the racial context. If law 
firms are less likely to hire blacks than whites, blacks will, other 
things being equal, be less inclined than whites to go to law school. 
If shops are less likely to hire blacks than whites, blacks will be less 
likely than whites to. acquire the skills necessary to work in shops. 
In every sector of the market that contains discrimination, the be-
havior of prospective black employees will be affected, in the sense 
that blacks will scale back their investments in acquiring the requi-
site training and skills. 
The result of these various factors can be a vicious circle or even 
a spiral. Because of existing discrimination, members of the rele-
vant groups will invest less in human capital. Because of this lower 
investment, the discrimination may persist or even increase, be-
cause its statistical rationality increases. Because of this effect, the 
discriminatory tastes of employers · and customers may well in-
crease. Because of this effect, investments in human capital will de-
crease still further, and so on. 
These considerations suggest that although free markets can 
often help further the cause of race and gender equality, they are 
not a panacea. Discrimination can persist because of the effects of 
third-party discriminators, because of statistical discrimination, and 
because of adverse effects on investment in human capital.21 If dis-
crimination is to be reduced,22 markets are not enough; supplemen-
tal legal controls will be necessary. Empirical questions are very 
important here, and we cannot get a full handle on the subject with-
out knowing a great deal about the facts. For example, in some 
imaginable contexts, third-party prejudice will be too weak to pro-
mote much discrimination, and in some imaginable contexts, preju-
dice will be a spur to further investments in human capital. What I 
am suggesting here, based on highly plausible assumptions and sup-
ported by recognizable phenomena in the United States, is that free 
markets can fail to undermine race and sex inequality. 
B. Preferences? 
I tum now to an influential claim about the relationship be-
tween discrimination and law. The claim is that the legal system 
should take preferences as a given rather than attempt to alter 
21. Of course women and blacks have sometimes invested a large amount to overcome 
discrimination, and of course I am describing possibilities, not certainties. To see the effects 
of free markets on race and sex equality, a good deal of empirical data is necessary. 
22. The question whether discrimination should be reduced requires a theory of equality, 
which reliance on free markets does not itself provide. 
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them. This claim seems especially important for sex equality, 
though it bears on race equality as well. In many different nations, 
and in some places in the United States, women frequently say that 
they are content with the sexual status quo. Legal efforts might 
therefore be thought to represent an unacceptable form of pater-
nalism. If women themselves are content, on what basis can the 
legal system intervene? Is not legal intervention an illegitimate in-
terference with the right to liberty or autonomy? Thus some people 
suggest, for example, that abortion cannot possibly raise problems 
of sex equality because many women are opposed to abortion.23 
These questions raise some complex issues; I deal with them 
only briefly here.24 The basic response is that a social or legal sys-
tem that has produced preferences, and has done so by limiting op-
portunities unjustly, can hardly justify itself by reference to existing 
preferences. The satisfaction of private preferences, whatever their 
content and origins, does not respond to a persuasive conception of 
liberty, welfare, or autonomy. The notion of autonomy should refer 
instead to decisions reached with a full and vivid awareness of avail-
able opportunities, with relevant information, and without illegiti-
mate or excessive constraints on the process of preference 
formation. When there is inadequate information or opportunity, 
decisions and even preferences should be described as unfree or 
nonautonomous. 
Private preferences often do adjust to limitations in current 
practices and opportunities. Consider here the story of the fox and 
the sour grapes.25 The fox does not want the grapes because he 
considers them to be sour, but his belief that the grapes are sour is 
based on the fact that they are unavailable. One cannot therefore 
justify the cessation of the fox's efforts to get the grapes by refer-
ence to the fox's preferences. Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication 
of the Rights of Women26 applies this b,asic idea to the area of dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. Wollstonecraft writes, "I will ven-
ture to affirm, that a girl, whose spirits have not been damped by 
inactivity, or innocence tainted by false shame, will always be a 
romp, and the doll will never excite attention unless confinement 
23. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, How Not To Promote Serious Deliberation About 
Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1190 & nn.17-18 (1991) (book review). 
24. For further discussion, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, v ALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOM-
ICS (1993); JoN ELSTER, SouR GRAPES (1983); SEN, supra note 1, at 53-55. 
25. See ELSTER, supra note 24, at 109-40 (including an extended argument on the point). 
26. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (Carol H. 
Poston ed., Norton & Co. 1975) (2d ed. 1792). 
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allows her no alternative."27 Mill makes the same points in his 
work on sex equality.2s 
Amartya Sen offers an especially vivid real-world example from 
India. In 1944, the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health 
surveyed widows and widowers about their health. About 48.5% of 
the widowers said that they were "ill" or in "indifferent" health, 
while only 2.5% of widows gave the same response.29 In these cir-
cumstances it would seem odd to base health policy on subjectively 
held views about health conditions. Such an approach would en-
sure that existing discrimination would be severely aggravated. 
One goal of a legal system is, in short, to ensure autonomy not 
merely in the satisfaction of preferences but also and more funda-
mentally in the processes of preference formation. The view that 
freedom requires an opportunity to choose among alternatives finds 
a natural supplement in the view that people should not face unjus-
tifiable constraints on the free development of their preferences 
and beliefs. 
This discussion does not at all mean that government should feel 
free to reject existing views of the citizenry, or that such views are 
irrelevant to antidiscrimination policy. For purely prudential rea-
sons, it is important for government to be cautious about intruding 
on widespread current views even if it seems clear that they are 
wrong. A system of governmental reforms that does not connect 
with public convictions is likely to be futile or self-defeating. More-
over, government is itself vulnerable to the same distortions that 
affect private preferences.30 There is no reason to think that the 
judgments that underlie government action are systematically less 
susceptible to distortion than the judgments that underlie private 
action. In addition, there is certainly some relation between private 
desires and individual and social welfare, and for this reason private 
desires should generally count in deciding on appropriate policy. 
For all these reasons government should be modest in its will-
ingness to revisit private desires and beliefs; certainly it should be 
cautious before proceeding against apparently widespread public 
judgments. All I suggest here is that private preferences are an un-
27. Id. at 43. 
28. See JoHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WoMEN 15-16 (MIT Press 1970) (1869) 
(writing against the claim that the existing desires of women are a product of consent). 
29. AMARTYA SEN, CoMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 82 (1985); see generally JOSEPH 
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 169-72 (1994). 
30. See W. KIP V1scus1, FATAL TRADEOFFS 21-23 (1992) (illustrating this point for risk 
perceptions). 
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promising foundation for antidiscrimination policy to the extent 
that such preferences can be shown to be a product of unjust back-
ground conditions. 
C. Irrational or Unreasonable Distinctions? 
Much of equality law has proceeded by asking whether similarly 
situated people have been treated differently. On this view, blacks 
can be treated differently from whites only when they are different 
from whites; the same is true of differential treatment between 
women and men. At least implicitly, legal doctrines in the area of 
discrimination allow differences in treatment when people really 
are different and ban differences in treatment when people really 
are the same.31 
It will readily appear that the notion that the similarly situated 
must be treated similarly is purely formal. To become workable, 
that notion requires a substantive theory explaining what sorts of 
similarities and differences are relevant. Blacks and whites, for ex-
ample, are differently situated along many dimensions; so too are 
women and men. The government could not justify a racially dis-
criminatory law enforcement policy on the ground that blacks are 
disproportionately involved in crime, even if such a policy could be 
justified by reference to actual racial differences with respect to 
participation in crime. What is necessary is a theory to explain 
when differences will be treated as relevant. By itself the "similarly 
situated" test cannot supply that theory. From this we might con-
clude that the problem with the theory is that it is empty, not that it 
is wrong.32 
As a reaction to the "similarly situated" test in the abstract, this 
conclusion seems right. But from Supreme Court jurisprudence 
over the last few decades, we can construct a general understanding 
31. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981) (upholding men·only draft regis· 
tration on the grounds that "[m]en and women, because of the combat restrictions on 
women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft"); Michael M. v. Superior 
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding a statutory rape law applying 
only to underage females because "the statute ... reasonably reflects the fact that the conse-
quences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than the male"); 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1977) (upholding a statute that treated men and 
women differently with respect to social security benefits because Congress acted to compen· 
sate women for past employment discrimination); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 
(1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down a statute that treated men and women differently 
with respect to social security benefits in part because C-0ngress did not enact the scheme "to 
remedy the arguably greater needs of women"). 
32. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-48 (1982) 
(arguing that equality is meaningless without a separate standard for judging whether people 
are the same or different). 
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of what the test means, and this understanding is not merely formal. 
On that understanding, blacks must be treated the same as whites 
to the extent that they are the same as whites; women must be 
treated the same as men to the extent that they are the same as 
men. But these ideas also seem unhelpful. To what extent are 
blacks the same as whites, and to what extent are women the same 
as men? The law has answered this question largely by saying that 
blacks and whites should almost always be taken to be the same, 
and that women should be taken to be the same as men unless there 
is (i) a physical difference associated with reproduction,33 (ii) a le-
gally constructed difference not itself in dispute,34 or (iii) a differ-
ence closely associated with past discrimination for which the law in 
dispute operates as a remedy or compensation.35 In all other cases, 
distinctions based on race and gender should be struck down as ir-
rational, as stereotypical, or as based on hostility and prejudice.36 It 
follows that the law operates as a ban on formal inequality of the 
sort that prohibits most explicit distinctions between men and 
women or blacks and whites. 
There is much to be said on behalf of invalidating formal distinc-
tions on the basis of race and gender. Wholesale disparagement of 
the pursuit of formal equality makes little sense. In the racial con-
text, formal inequality is often associated with second-class citizen-
ship for blacks. Sometimes the same has been true for gender as 
well, as in the exclusion of women from the jury and from the prac-
tice of law. Many formal distinctions do help produce inequality in 
the form of second-class status, and many of them are based on 
prejudice. Even if some formal distinctions between blacks and 
whites or men and women can be justified, a strong presumption 
against such distinctions might be defended as being well adapted 
to the limited capacities of courts. Individualized inquiry into the 
legitimacy of formal distinctions might produce too many errors in 
particular cases. Perhaps a fl.at ban on race and sex distinctions 
could be justified as a way of producing results that make sense in 
the aggregate and that allow errors that are few enough in number 
to be acceptable in light of the risks that would be produced by 
more individualized inquiry. In addition, formal inequalities tend 
33. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471-73. 
34. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78. 
35. Webster, 430 U.S. at 318. 
36. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a statute that permitted 
women but not men between the ages of 18 and 20 to purchase 3.2% beer); see also cases 
cited supra note 31. 
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to encourage people to think in terms of race and gender, and a 
broad prohibition on laws containing such inequalities therefore has 
a desirable educative or expressive effect. 
Similar ideas could help justify a judicial refusal to test carefully 
laws that discriminate in fact but that do not embody formal ine-
quality.37 Careful scrutiny of laws that discriminate in fact but not 
on their face might lead courts to face issues that are beyond their 
competence and best assessed legislatively. Consider the extraordi-
nary difficulties that would be raised by asking whether a veteran's 
preference law would be adopted in a world of sex equality, or 
whether it could be adequately justified in light of its discriminatory 
effects.38 
These considerations might form the basis for a justification of 
the Supreme Court's current equality jurisprudence, casting it as 
reasonable in principle and sensibly adapted to the courts' modest 
role. But there is a. problem with this project. It is not at all simple 
to come up with a sensible theory of equality that would map onto, 
or adequately account for, the existing approach. On what possible 
theory would the Constitution ban all explicit race and sex distinc-
tions and allow all other laws to stand? There are two problems 
here. 
First, some deviations from formal equality might well promote 
equality as that term is often or best understood. Consider, for ex-
ample, a decision of a local police department to furnish special 
police protection for women who are traveling alone at night, and 
suppose that the decision was based on a recent outbreak of sexual 
violence in the area. It is at least unclear that this decision is incon-
sistent with equality as it is best understood. Perhaps it promotes 
equality by counteracting social conditions that subject women to 
disproportionate risks.39 From this example it may follow that 
some laws that treat women differently from men are acceptable 
and indeed promote the goal of equality, rightly understood. 
Califano v. Webster, 40 upholding formal sex discrimination in the 
benefit formula under social security law, is an explicit and unusual 
reflection of this point. Perhaps a maternal deference rule could be 
37. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976). 
38. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 935, 1000-03 {1989). 
39. Cf Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) {plurality opinion) (upholding 
a sex discriminatory statutory rape law on the ground that nature already deters women from 
engaging in sexual intercourse by imposing the penalty of pregnancy, something to which 
men are not subject). 
40. 430 U.S. 313 (1977). 
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justified during child custody proceedings; perhaps alimony deter-
minations should be required to consider domestic work, which is 
closely correlated with gender.41 
Alternatively, some laws raise equality concerns even if they do 
not violate formal equality. Consider a law that forbids pregnant 
women from appearing in public. Perhaps no man can be similarly 
situated to a pregnant woman, and perhaps there is no problem, 
from the standpoint of formal equality, in these circumstances. But 
from the standpoint of sex equality, does this make any sense? 
Surely problems of inequality are raised by a law that penalizes a 
physical capacity limited to one gender.42 Or suppose that the law 
forbids women from having an abortion, or excludes pregnancy 
from a disability program. Under current constitutional law, there 
is apparently no issue of sex discrimination.43 Men cannot get preg-
nant; women and men are to that extent not similarly situated. A 
law that restricts abortion or excludes pregnancy therefore raises no 
equality problem. But this is an odd way to think about equality. If 
the law takes a characteristic limited to one group of citizens and 
turns that characteristic into a source of social disadvantage, it may 
well violate the equality principle, best conceived.44 
Let us push this argument further. Sometimes equality requires 
the similarly situated to be treated similarly. But sometimes people 
who are differently situated ought to be treated differently, pre-
cisely in the interest of equality.45 In the area of disabilities, for 
example, the use of stairs denies equality to people who are bound 
to wheelchairs, and the use of oral communication creates a prob-
lem for people who cannot hear. Legislative changes have. often 
been based on an understanding that people who are different must 
41. The point is made nicely in Mary E. Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and 
Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S Sroo. 133, 203-23 (1993), and Mary E. Becker, 
Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. Cr. REv. 201, 219-22. 
42. But cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 760-62 (1993) 
(holding that "the disfavoring of abortion ... is not ipso facto sex discrimination"); Geduldig 
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-96 & n.20 (1974) (holding that excluding pregnancy coverage 
from a state disability program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause absent an intent 
to discriminate, even though "it is true that only women can become pregnant"). 
43. See Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760-62; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-98 & n.20. But note too the 
striking appearance of arguments involving sex discrimination in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807, 2809, 2830-31 (1992) Goint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & 
Souter, JJ.); 112 S. Ct. at 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 112 S. 
Ct. at 2846-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
44. See the discussion of differences in CATHARINE MACKINNON, Difference and Domi-
nance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32 (1987). 
45. See SEN, supra note 1, at 16-19 (arguing that achieving equality in one area may ne-
cessitate inequality in another area). 
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be treated differently if they are to be treated equally.46 Of course, 
the expense of the adaptation is relevant to the question of what, 
exactly, ought to be done. But constitutional doctrine has rarely 
recognized that differences in people's situations might justify a 
claim for differential treatment in the interest of equality. 
We can connect this issue to the broader failure of American 
law to do as much as it might have about existing inequalities on the 
basis of both sex and race. In many areas there has been much 
progress; women cannot be excluded from professions, and most 
laws that build on or ratify sex-based stereotypes are forbidden.47 
But if we look at the basic indicators of social welfare, it is not clear , 
how much difference the law has made.48 The relative labor-
market status of women has not changed much in the aftermath of 
judicial decisions.49 The difference between the earnings of women 
and of men was greater in 1980 than it was in 1955, even though the 
key Supreme Court decisions were in the 1970s.50 Women continue 
to face occupational segregation in the workforce, and the result is 
that women disproportionately occupy low-paying positions tradi-
tionally identified as female.51 Thus Gerald Rosenberg's influential 
study concludes that "[c]ourt action contributed little to eliminating 
discriminatiqn against women. Cases were argued and won but, liti-
gants aside, little was accomplished."SZ 
This conclusion is probably too blunt. It is hard to measure the 
real-world effects of Supreme Court decisions, and the ban on un-
equal treatment by government may well have made an important 
difference for many women, even if it is hard for social scientists to 
tie real-world changes to judicial decisions. A degree of agnosti-
cism makes good sense here. But it is highly revealing that the re-
quirement of formal equality cannot be easily associated with large-
scale changes in the social welfare of women. 
46. The most important example is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213) (Supp. IV 
1992). 
47. See cases cited supra note 31. 
48. See infra text accompanying notes 122-27; see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE 207-12 (1991) (concluding that "(l]itigation has failed to end [sex] discrimina-
tion"); Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences, and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
169, 172-74 (arguing that while antidiscrimination laws have produced progress for women, 
they have not made women economically equal to men). 
49. ROSENBERG, supra note 48, at 207. 
50. Id. at 207, 209 tbl. 7.1. 
51. Id. at 209-10. 
52. Id. at 212. 
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Ironically, some existing inequalities may be partly a product of 
contemporary equality law. After divorce, women's economic wel-
fare goes sharply down, whereas men's goes sharply up.s3 Legal 
rules, not nature, assure this result by generally refusing to take ac-
count of domestic contributions and by refusing to regard the hus-
band's success in the employment market as a joint asset. The 
relevant rules might well be subject to legal attack. 
Certainly some existing inequalities stem from laws that do not 
violate formal equality. Consider veterans' preference laws, sex-
based in effect if not in intent. Such laws are immune from attack 
under the formal equality standard, but they can have enormous 
effects on state employment.s4 Perhaps more important is the exist-
ence of a social security system that was designed for and that bene-
fits male breadwinners, while helping women much less because 
women do not follow conventional male career paths.ss The failure 
to provide adequate protection against rape, sexual harassment, 
and other forms of sexual assault and abuse might also raise equal-
ity issues; these failures raise no problems under the formal equality 
approach. 
Now we are in a position to make some general observations 
about the question of race and sex differences. The question for 
decision is not whether there is a difference - often there certainly 
is - but whether the legal and social treatment of that difference 
can be adequately justified. Differences need not imply inequality, 
and only some differences have that implication. When differences 
do have that implication, the implication is a result of legal and so-
cial practices, not the result of differences alone. Because they are 
legal and social, these practices might be altered even if the differ-
ences remain.s6 Existing law recognizes this point insofar as formal 
discrimination on the basis of race and sex is prohibited even if 
based on differences that are "real" in the sense that as a matter of 
simple fact, blacks are not similarly situated to whites and women 
53. See OKIN, supra note 18, at 160-67, 337; LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION 337-40 (1985). 
54. See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) (holding that a Massachu-
setts law giving absolute lifetime preferences to veterans for civil service positions does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause even though the law "operates overwhelmingly to the 
advantage of males"). 
55. See Becker, supra note 48, at 176-78 (citing statistics to show the adverse conse-
quences of structural discrimination in the social security system). 
56. See MAcKINNON, supra note 44, at 32-45 (arguing for an equality principle focusing 
on gender dominance, not gender difference); see also JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
107-08 (1971) (stressing how the social structure affects the naturally unequal distribution of 
talents and privileges). 
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are not similarly situated to men.57 But existing law stops short in-
sofar as it does not allow attacks on discriminatory but facially neu-
tral practices based on an unequal status quo.ss 
An analogy may be helpful here. The problems faced by dis-
abled people are not a function of disability "alone" (an almost im-
penetrable idea - what would current disabilities even mean in a 
different world?) but are instead the result of the interaction be-
tween physical and mental capacities on the one hand and a set of 
human obstacles made by and for the able-bodied on the other. It 
is those human obstacles, rather than the capacities taken as brute 
facts, that create a large part of what it means to be disabled. One 
could not defend, for example, the construction of a building with 
stairs and without means of access for those on wheelchairs on the 
ground that those who need wheelchairs are different. The ques-
tion is whether it is acceptable, or just, to construct a building that 
excludes people who need an unusual means of entry. That ques-
tion may not be a simple one, but it cannot be answered simply by 
pointing to a difference. 
We might conclude that there are two fundamental problems 
with the "similarly situated" idea. The first is that the idea cannot 
be made operational without a theory of some kind. The second is 
that the implicit theory behind the current approach seems hard to 
justify or even to describe. The best defense would suggest that the 
approach is adapted to a reasonable understanding of equality, or 
several reasonable understandings, while at the same time being 
uniquely well suited to judicial administration. This defense is far 
from implausible, but it suggests that a full justification of the con-
stitutional equality principle remains to be offered. 
IL THE ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE 
A. Definition 
I suggest that in American constitutional law, an important 
equality principle stems from opposition to caste. This principle 
grows out of the original rejection of the monarchical legacy59 and 
57. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion) (forbidding 
discrimination in social security even though men are less frequently dependent on their 
spouses than are women); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427 n.11 
(1994) (stating that peremptory challenges are forbidden even if women's perceptions really 
are different from men's); 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Jaw 
does not always take real differences into account). 
58. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260. 
59. See GORDON s. Wooo, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95-109 
(1992) (discussing consequences of the attack on monarchical heritage). 
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the explicit constitutional ban on titles of nobility.60 The principle 
was fueled by the Civil War Amendments and the New Deal. The 
opposition should be understood as an effort to eliminate, in places 
large and small, the caste system rooted in race and gender. A law 
is therefore objectionable on grounds of equality if it contributes to 
such a caste system. The controlling principle is that no group may 
be made into second-class citizens. Instead of asking "Are blacks 
or women similarly situated to whites or men, and if so have they 
been treated differently?" we should ask "Does the law or practice 
in question contribute to the maintenance of second-class citizen-
ship, or lower-caste status, for blacks or women?" 
I do not suggest that the caste features of current American 
practices are at all the same, in nature or extent, as those features of 
genuine caste societies. I do not suggest that dictionary definitions 
of caste, or caste systems as understood in, say, India, lead to the 
simple conclusion that there are major caste characteristics to mod-
ern American society. Certainly it is true that blacks and women 
have risen to most of the highest reaches of American society; cer-
tainly it is true that the most conspicuous legal barriers have fallen; 
and these phenomena, along with many others, suggest that we do 
not have anything like a genuine caste system. But the similarities 
between true caste systems and existing American inequalities are 
what make our current practices a reason for collective concern. 
The motivating idea behind an anticaste principle is that without 
good reason, social and legal structures should not turn differences 
that are both highly visible and irrelevant from the moral point of 
view into systematic social disadvantages. A systematic disadvan-
tage is one that operates along standard and predictable lines in 
multiple and important spheres of life and that applies in realms 
that relate to basic participation as a citizen in a democracy. There 
is no algorithm by which to identify those realms. As a provisional 
working list, we might include education, freedom from private and 
public violence, income and wealth, political representation, lon-
gevity, health, and political influence. The anticaste principle sug-
gests that with respect to basic human capabilities and 
functionings,61 one group, defined in terms of a morally irrelevant 
characteristic, ought not to be systematically below another. As we 
will soon see, the Civil War Amendments can be understood as an 
effort to counteract this form of disadvantage. 62 
60. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
61. See SEN, supra note 1, at 39-42 (discussing capabilities and functionings). 
62. See infra text accompanying notes 81-89. 
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In the areas of race and sex discrimination, a large part of the 
problem is this sort of systemic disadvantage. A social or biological 
difference has the effect of systematically subordinating members of 
the relevant group - not because of nature, but because of social 
and legal practices. This phenomenon occurs in multiple spheres 
and along multiple indices of social welfare: poverty, education, 
political power, employment, susceptibility to violence and crime, 
distribution of labor within the family, and so forth. My emphasis 
on these variables should make clear that I am not stressing eco-
nomic factors alone, though these are indeed important. I am in-
stead suggesting reference to a broad and eclectic set of social 
indicators. 
Consider in this regard the Human Development Index in the 
United Nations' 1993 Human Development Report.63 The index, 
based on longevity, educational attainment, and per capita income, 
is itself extremely crude.64 But it is highly revealing that the United 
States as a whole ranks sixth; that white Americans by themselves 
would rank first; and that black Americans by themselves would 
rank thirty-first, next to Trinidad and Tobago.65 Consider as well 
the fact that every nation in the survey provides better lives for men 
than for women.66 
Systematic differences of this kind help produce frequent inju-
ries to self-respect - the time-honored constitutional notion of 
"stigma." A particular concern is that self-respect and its social ba-
ses ought not to be distributed along the lines of race and gender.67 
When someone is a member of a group that is systematically 
subordinate to others, and when the group characteristic is highly 
visible, insults to self-respect are likely to occur nearly every day. 
An important aspect of a system of caste is that social practices pro-
duce a range of obstacles to the development of self-respect, largely 
because of the presence of the highly visible but morally irrelevant 
characteristic that gives rise to lower-caste status. Of course the law 
cannot provide self-respect, at least not in any simple or direct way. 
But group membership tends to fuel the cycle of discrimination dis-
63. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993 (1993) 
[hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT). 
64. See Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same·Sex 
Marriages, 92 M1cH. L. REv. 2456, 2163-68 (1994) (this issue); Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being 
and the State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1303, 1322 (1994). 
65. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 63, at 18 & figs. 1.12-.13. 
66. Id. at 18 & tbl. 1.3. 
67. Self-respect is emphasized in RAWLS, supra note 56, at 440-46, and JoHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 82, 106, 180-81 (1993). 
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cussed in Part I, in which employers rely on statistical discrimina-
tion, group members adjust their aspirations to this reliance, 
statistical discrimination becomes all the more rational, and so on.6s 
That is the caste system to which the legal system must respond. 
The system can operate largely because of the high visibility of the 
group characteristic. 
Ideas of this kind raise some obvious questions: Should we not 
speak of individuals instead of groups? Is it not equally bad to 
have, say, ten percent of the population in desperate or unfortunate 
conditions, as compared with having a high percentage of black 
Americans in such conditions? And exactly why must the morally 
irrelevant characteristic be highly visible? It is true that an old and 
independent liberal principle protects freedom from desperate con-
ditions, 69 and that principle is offended whenever people do not 
have basic subsistence. Freedom from desperate conditions is a lib-
eral principle connected with both equality and liberty, and it can 
be violated even in the absence of group-based disadvantages. 
What I am suggesting is that a separate problem of inequality, one 
with constitutional dimensions, arises when a group of people, de-
fined in terms of a characteristic that is both highly visible and mor-
ally irrelevant, faces second-class status. The anticaste principle 
may be offended by second-class status even if most or all of the 
caste's members are living at or above a decent floor. A special 
problem with use of a highly visible but morally irrelevant charac-
teristic is that each group member - every black American and 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
69. Thus Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable. But the consequences 
of this enormous inequality producing so much misery to the bulk of mankind, legisla-
tors cannot invent too many devices for subdividing property, only taking care to let 
their subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural affections of the human mind .... 
Another means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from 
taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical 
progression as they rise. Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and un-
employed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to 
violate the natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labour and 
live on. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 681, 682 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1953). 
Similarly, James Madison wrote: 
The great object should be to combat the evil: 1. By establishing a political equality 
among all. 2. By withholding unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the ine-
quality of property, by an immoderate and especially an unmerited, accumulation of 
riches. 3. By the silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, 
reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence to-
wards a state of comfort. 
James Madison, Parties, NATL. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 197, 197 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). 
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every woman - may well be subject, some of the time, to a distinc-
tive stigma by virtue of group membership. That stigma is part of 
what it means to be a member of a lower caste. 
Because the stigmatizing characteristic is highly visible, it will 
probably trigger reactions from others in a wide variety of spheres, 
even in the interstices of everyday life.70 Highly visible characteris-
tics are especially likely to be a basis for statistical discrimination 
and to fuel prejudice from third parties. For some purposes, how-
ever, it might make sense to speak as well of characteristics that, 
while not highly visible, are easily verified. And often characteris-
tics become visible, or are thought to be visible, precisely because 
they are a basis for social disadvantage. Consider stereotypes about 
the physical characteristics of members of religious minorities, and 
compare this description of attitudes in prerevolutionary America: 
So distinctive and so separated was the aristocracy from ordinary 
folk that many still thought the two groups represented two orders of 
being .... Ordinary people were thought to be different physically, 
and because of varying diets and living conditions, no doubt in many 
cases they were different. People often assumed that a handsome 
child, though apparently a commoner, had to be some gentleman's 
bastard offspring.71 
In the area of race and gender, daily denials of basic respect, 
usually based on prejudice of some sort, are a large part of what it 
means to have a caste system. With blacks, for example, dark skin 
color is associated with a range of stereotypes that can have harm-
ful effects during encounters with shopkeepers, employers, police 
officers, businesses, co-workers, and much more. With women, the 
problem is not so much hostility as a range of expectations about 
social role that are closely associated with inequality or condescen-
sion, often in the nominally personal and even familial sphere.72 It 
is for this reason that the argument I am making works best when 
the morally irrelevant characteristic is highly visible.73 When the 
characteristic is not highly visible, we cannot have a caste system as 
I understand it here, though the translation into disadvantage of a 
70. See Jane Mansbridge, Equal Citizenship in Everyday Life, Presentation to the Confer-
ence on Equal Protection and its Critics at Brown University (Mar. 11-12, 1994) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (discussing daily effects of inequality). 
71. Wooo, supra note 59, at 27. 
72. See OKIN, supra note 18, at 134-69. 
73. Compare Justice Marshall's reference to a black railroad porter who reported that 
"he had been in every city in this country ... and he had never been in any city in the United 
States where he had to put his hand up in front of his face to find out he was a Negro." 
Henry J. Reske, Marshall Retires for Health Reasons: First Black Justice Fought Discrimina-
tion As Litigator, Supreme Court Dissenter, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991, at 14, 15 (quoting Justice 
Thurgood Marshall). 
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morally irrelevant but invisible characteristic74 can raise important · . 
equality concerns as well.75 
Under the principle I am describing, a history of discrimination 
is not a necessary condition for status as a lower caste, though in 
practice such a history is highly probable. No group is likely to be-
come second class in the sense used here unless it has been subject 
to past discrimination. The discrimination may take the form of 
legal and social practices that are not discriminatory on their face 
but that translate certain characteristics into a systemic basis for dis-
advantage.76 If social and legal practices have that consequence, we 
have a system with castelike features and a legal response is appro-
priate - even though the absence of intentional discrimination 
may make the call for response less insistent. 
B. Markets, History, Institutions 
1. Markets and Moral Irrelevance 
The anticaste principle leaves many ambiguities. What is the set 
of morally irrelevant differences? What does it mean to say that 
such differences may be turned into disadvantages if the state has 
good reasons for doing so? And who will be doing the remedial 
work? 
The initial point is that whether it is permissible to invoke a 
morally irrelevant difference is determined by the context.77 As a 
general rule skin color should be taken to be morally irrelevant, but 
for some people it may be made relevant to private life, as in the 
selection of intimate friends; gender may play a large role in many 
74. This may well be true of homosexuality. Under my definition, homosexuals do not 
constitute a lower caste, though discrimination against them may be illegitimate and though 
the caste system based on gender may lie behind discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men ls Sex Discrim-
ination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. {forthcoming May 1994) (arguing that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination). 
75. I return to the issue of moral irrelevance below. See infra notes 92-94 and accompa-
nying text. 
76. Of course there is no state-of-nature argument here. Any second-class status is a 
product of law, even if some inequalities would arise in the state of nature, a possibility with 
no moral weight. See John Stuart Mill, Nature, in 10 COLLECTED WoRKS OF JOHN STUART 
MILL 373, 381-401 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969). 
77. I am bracketing for the moment questions of justice within spheres that are not nor-
mally described as political. See OKIN, supra note 18. Susan Okin persuasively shows that 
injustice occurs within families and that this source of injustice is associated with many injus-
tices elsewhere. Susan M. Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHICS (forth-
coming Oct. 1994). The anticaste principle picks up on this idea. See supra text 
accompanying notes 63-66, 70-72. For some, gender may be morally relevant to some per-
sonal things, as in choice of partner, without being morally relevant to all personal things, as 
in allocation of labor within the household. 
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private choices, as in the selection of dancing partners. When I 
speak of the impermissibility of turning morally irrelevant factors 
into a systematic source of social disadvantage, I do not mean to 
deny that in many settings morally irrelevant factors may well be 
used. But even this point leaves numerous open questions. We do 
not have anything like a full account of what sorts of differences are 
relevant to legitimate official judgments. Can such an account be 
provided here? 
For lawyers, at least, many of the political and moral complexi-
ties can be bracketed. Perhaps those involved in the legal system 
can build on the general understanding that race and gender are 
irrelevant from the moral point of view without making complex 
and perhaps sectarian claims about moral relevance in general. In-
deed, one happy feature of legal thinking is that participants in legal 
disputes can often bracket large-scale claims about the right and the 
good and build incompletely theorized agreements about particular 
issues.78 There is general public or judicial agreement that race and 
sex are morally irrelevant in the sense that the distribution of social 
benefits and burdens ought not to depend on skin color or gender. 
This agreement is founded on good reasons, because both of these 
are accidents of birth, because accidents of birth should not pro-
duce second-class citizenship, and because it is hard to imagine an 
account that would justify lesser benefits or greater burdens by ref-
erence to these particular accidents.79 To say this is not to say that 
social roles must have nothing to do with gender; many people 
think that roles and gender cannot be entirely separated. But it is 
to say that social disadvantage cannot be justified by reference to 
race or sex alone, and that point is sufficient for my purposes here. 
Nor, for lawyers, is the notion of moral irrelevance a new one. 
The anticaste principle has distinctive historical roots. Recall that 
the Constitution forbids titles of nobility and that an important part 
of the founding creed involved the rejection of the monarchical her-
itage, largely on the ground that monarchy made caste distinctions 
78. This idea is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Analogies, 11 THE TANNER 
LECTURES ON HuMAN VALUES (forthcoming 1995); it has an obvious resemblance to the 
idea of "overlapping consensus" as found in RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 67, 
at 133-72. 
79. Compare on this score such accidents of birth as great strength or intelligence or 
ability to produce products that the market rewards. These accidents may be entangled with 
nonaccidental factors; promoting them brings about desirable incentives and also is associ-
ated with a range of valuable social goals, like increased productivity. Of course it would be 
possible to say that when people do not like people of certain races, there is a productivity 
loss from forbidding them to indulge their "taste" - sometimes this may even be true - but 
this productivity loss seems inadequate to overcome the basic case offered in the text. 
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among fundamentally equal human beings.80 The Civil War 
Amendments were rooted in a judgment about the moral irrele-
vance of race, formerly taken to be relevant because of nature. In 
the aftermath of the American Civil War a high U.S. official stated, 
"God himself has set His seal of distinctive difference between the 
two races, and no human legislation can overrule the Divine de-
cree. "81 In the same period, antidiscrimination law was challenged 
squarely on the ground that it put the two races in "unnatural rela-
tion" to each other.s2 
The Civil War Amendments were based on a wholesale rejec-
tion of the supposed naturalness of racial hierarchy. The hierarchy 
was thought to be a function not of natural difference but of law, 
most notably the law of slavery and the various measures that grew 
up in the aftermath of abolition. An important purpose of the Civil 
War Amendments was the attack on racial caste.83 Thus Senator 
Howard explained that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to "abolish[] all class legislation in the States and [do] away 
with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not 
applicable to another."84 The defining case of the Black Codes, 
placing special disabilities on the freedmen's legal capacities, exem-
plified the concern with caste legislation.85 Thus Justice Harlan, 
dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 86 wrote one of the greatest 
sentences in American law:. "There is no caste here."87 Contempo-
rary understandings of sex inequality build on this basic idea.88 
I do not contend that the anticaste principle, as I describe it 
here, can be understood as a mechanical reflection of pre- and post-
Civil War aspirations. The ratifiers did believe that caste or class 
legislation was forbidden; but they did not fully unpack the cate-
gory. They understood that legislation always made distinctions 
80. See Wooo, supra note 59, at 254-61 (arguing that although the Federalists and the 
anti-Federalists disagreed as to how privileged the government leaders needed to be, both 
opposed monarchical hierarchy based on heredity alone). 
81. 2 CoNG. REc. app. at 3 (1874) (speech of Rep. Southard). 
82. 3 CoNG. REc. 983 (1875) (statement of Rep. Eldredge). 
83. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 
2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended 
to forbid discrimination against blacks at the state level). 
84. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
85. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE LJ. 
1385, 1413 (1992) (explaining how Black Codes were used to prevent blacks from enjoying a 
wide variety of social and legal privileges available to whites, including testifying in court and 
owning property). 
86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
87. 163 U.S. at 559. 
88. See Okin, supra note 77. 
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among persons, and they thought the category of caste or class leg-
islation was a small subset of legislation, involving illegitimate 
grounds for differential treatment. In seeing what counted as ille-
gitimate grounds, they looked not to theory but to slavery and the 
Black Codes as defining illustrations. So far there is considerable 
overlap between an important strand in the Civil War period and 
what I am urging here. But the Civil War Amendments were 
targeted at caste legislation, that is, at specific laws that embodied 
discrimination and in this way helped to create caste. This is what 
Justice Harlan had in mind in Plessy. There was no general under-
standing that these amendments imposed on government a general 
duty to remove caste status or banned nondiscriminatory laws that 
contributed to caste status - even if it was understood that Con-
gress would have the power to counteract the legacy of slavery with 
affirmative legislation. 89 
The anticaste principle as I understand it here is more ambi-
tious. It is not directed merely at caste legislation but more gener-
ally at a social status quo that, through historical and current 
practices, creates second-class status. We can understand this prin-
ciple as emphasizing legislative rather than judicial duties and as 
reading the Civil War Amendments through the lens of the New 
Deal, which reflected an understanding that social practices are 
often a creation of law, at least in part, and that government is legit-
imately made responsible for practices that produce social evils, in-
cluding pervasive deprivation.90 Reading the Civil War 
Amendments through the lens of the New Deal,91 we might see a 
constitutional problem not only with particular caste legislation but 
with lower-caste status in general. 
Thus far I have emphasized social consensus and history. Per-
haps lawyers can build on these sources, but an adequate account of 
the subject of caste and moral irrelevance could not rest content 
with social agreement and with the past. I cannot offer that account 
here, but a few observations may be helpful. If the notion of moral 
89. See generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 796·97 {1985). 
90. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE TiiE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 100-04 (1991) (seeing both 
the Lochner Court and the New Deal as attempts to synthesize a coherent framework of 
rights out of existing sources of legal doctrine, including the Civil War Amendments); 
SuNSTEIN, supra note*, at 40-67 (arguing that New Deal jurisprudence recognized that social 
practices determining ownership rights, labor rights, and civil rights were themselves prod-
ucts of the legal regime). 
91. See the discussion of "synthesis" in ACKERMAN, supra note 90, at 140-50 (arguing 
that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reinterpreted Fourteenth Amend· 
ment equal protection requirements in light of post-Plessy social developments). 
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irrelevance involves a lack of connection to either entitlement or 
desert, we might think that a wide range of differences among peo-
ple are indeed morally arbitrary, in the sense that such differences 
do not by themselves justify more resources or greater welfare. In a 
market economy, those morally irrelevant differences are quite fre-
quently translated into social disadvantages. Consider educational 
background, intelligence, physical strength, and existing supply and 
demand curves for various products and services. Certainly some-
one does not deserve more goods and services merely by virtue of 
the fact that many people want what he is able to provide. Con-
sider an especially fast run from one side of a tennis court to an-
other, or a book about a murder that is especially entertaining to 
read. For good instrumental reasons, including the production of 
desired commodities, we may well want to reward people who can 
provide widely valued goods; but the relationship between that tal-
ent and desert or entitlement is obscure. 
In a market economy, many factors - strength, intelligence, 
and educational background - affect resources and welfare, and 
most of these factors are arbitrary from the moral point of view. Is 
someone really entitled to more money because he was born into a 
family that stressed education, or because of his intelligence, or be-
cause he happened to produce a commodity that many people like? 
Markets do reward qualities that are irrelevant from a moral point 
of view. But it would be difficult indeed to justify a principle that 
would attempt, through law, to counteract all or most of the factors 
that markets make relevant. The reason is that in general, the rec-
ognition of such factors is inseparable from the operation of a mar-
ket economy, and by and large, a market economy is a source of 
many important human goods, including individual freedom, eco-
nomic growth and prosperity, and respect for different conceptions 
of the good. Any legal solutions that call for major intrusions on 
markets must be evaluated in light of the effects on various possible 
human goods that those alleged solutions will compromise. If legal 
remedies produce more unemployment, greater poverty, and higher 
prices for food and other basic necessities, they are, to that extent, a 
bad idea. 
The implementation and reach of any anticaste principle should 
depend on considerations of this kind. The point is not that human 
equality should be "traded off" against the seemingly sterile and 
abstract notion of market efficiency. I do not claim that otherwise 
unjustified inequality can be supported by some intrinsic good 
called "efficiency." Efficiency is an instrumental good, though no 
2438 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2410 
less important for that. I argue only that intrusions on markets may 
defeat valuable human goals and that this is important to keep in 
mind. 
To be more precise: The use of the factors that ordinarily un-
derlie markets is at least sometimes, though of course not always, in 
the interest of the most disadvantaged, certainly in the sense that 
lower prices and higher employment are especially valuable to the 
poor. When this is so, any government initiative that would bar use 
of those factors - intelligence, production of socially valued goods, 
and so forth - seems perverse.92 Moreover, a principle that would 
override all morally irrelevant factors would impose extraordinary 
costs on society, both in its implementation and administrative ex-
pense and in its infliction of losses on a wide range of people. The 
anticaste principle seems to have greatest appeal in discrete con-
texts in which gains from current practice to the least well-off are 
hard to imagine; in which second-class citizenship is systemic and 
occurs in multiple spheres and along easily identifiable and sharply 
defined lines; in which the morally irrelevant characteristic is highly 
visible; in which there will be no major threat to a market economy; 
and in which the costs of implementation are most unlikely to be 
terribly high. 
Ideas of this sort do not justify a judgment that poor people 
constitute a lower caste. For one thing, poor people represent a 
broad, amorphous, not easily identified, and to some degree shifting 
group. When people are poor, we cannot say that social and legal 
practices turn a highly visible and morally irrelevant characteristic 
into a systemic source of social disadvantage. Of course human 
deprivation creates a significant problem of justice, and a recogniz-
able constitutional understanding tries to provide all people with 
freedom from desperate conditions.93 I mean here to identify a sep-
arate understanding - one that supports a legal assault on the 
castelike features of the status quo with respect to race, sex, and 
disability. It is relevant here that the benefits of antidiscrimination 
92. Rawls's difference principle, see RAWLS, supra note 56, at 60, would almost certainly 
fail to justify many of the inequalities that markets introduce, since many of those inequali-
ties do not benefit the least well-off. But a less rigid set of understandings, allowing inequali-
ties that benefit most people, including many of the disadvantaged, would justify reliance on 
markets, especially in light of the government's ability to use greater aggregate wealth to help 
disadvantaged people and to provide a basic floor. See the intriguing finding in NORMAN 
FROHLIC_H & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE 58-60 {1992), suggesting that in ex-
perimental studies most people choose average utility with a welfare floor, rather than the 
difference principle. 
93. See supra note 69. 
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law do seem substantial, and the negative effects on the economy 
appear minor.94 
2. Judges and Legislators 
Originally the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was 
understood as an effort to eliminate racial caste - emphatically not 
as a ban on distinctions on the basis of race.95 A prohibition on 
racial caste is of course different from a prohibition on racial dis-
tinctions. A ban on racial distinctions would excise all use of race in 
decisionmaking. By contrast, a ban on caste might well draw some 
measures having discriminatory effects into question, and it would 
certainly allow affirmative action programs.96 
Originally, Congress, not the courts, was to be the principal in-
stitution for implementing the Fourteenth Amendment. The basic 
idea was that Congress would transform the status of the newly 
freed slaves by engaging in a wide range of remedial measures.97 It 
was not at all anticipated that federal judges - responsible for the 
then-recent and highly visible Dred Scott v. Sanford98 decision, 
which established slavery as a constitutional right - would be en-
forcing the Amendment. Indeed, the notion that judges would play 
a major role in helping to bring about equality under law was en-
tirely foreign to the drafters and ratifiers of the Civil War 
Amendments. 
At some stage in the twentieth century, there was a dramatic 
change in the legal culture's understanding of the notion of equality 
under the Constitution. The anticaste principle was transformed 
94. See John J. Donohue Ill, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Con-
cepts of Equality, 92 M1cH. L. REv. 2583, 2600-01 (1994) (this issue) (describing antidis-
crimination laws as correcting market imperfections to some extent); James J. Heckman & 
Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Sta-
tus of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 19 AM. EcoN. REv. 138 (1989) (concluding that 
federal antidiscrimination law may account for increased wages and employment among 
blacks in the South Carolina textile manufacturing industry). 
95. This idea is supported by Justice Harlan's statement "There is no caste here," which 
appears in his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896), in the sen-
tence immediately preceding his famous assertion that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind." 
163 U.S. at 559. See the excellent discussion in T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice 
Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 961 (maintaining that Justice Harlan's dissent in P/essy can be read to support race-
conscious programs that combat subordination). 
96. See Schnapper, supra note 89, at 789-98 (arguing that history does not support the 
attack on affirmative action). 
97. See id. at 784-88 (arguing that Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to pro-
vide a constitutional basis for An Act To Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and 
Refugees, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865) [hereinafter Freedmen's Bureau Act]). 
98. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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into an antidifferentiation principle.99 No longer was the issue the 
elimination of second-class citizenship. The focus shifted instead to 
the entirely different question whether people who were similarly 
situated had been treated similarly - a fundamental change. This 
shift in focus remains one of the great untold stories of American 
constitutional history. 
So long as the courts were to be the institution entrusted with 
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, the shift was fully intelligi-
ble, notwithstanding its problematic relationship with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the best un-
derstanding of what race and sex inequality really are. The judici-
ary simply lacks the necessary tools to implement the anticaste 
principle. The transformation in the conception of equality is there-
fore understandable in light of what came to be, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, the astonishing institutional importance of 
courts and the equally astonishing institutional insignificance of 
Congress. But the transformation of an anticaste principle into a 
prohibition on racial differentiation has inadequately served the 
constitutional commitment to equal protection of the laws.100 It has 
meant that too little will be done about the second-class citizenship 
of blacks, women, and the disabled. 
If the legal culture is to return to the roots of the constitutional 
commitment and to a better understanding of equality, the legisla-
tive branch should take the lead. The anticaste principle, if taken 
seriously, calls for significant restructuring of social practices. For 
this reason legislative and administrative bodies, with their superior 
democratic pedigree and fact-finding capacities, can better imple-
ment the principle than can the courts.101 
Of course there are difficult issues of strategy, timing, and im-
plementation. Some legal interventions may not be fruitful; they 
may even be counterproductive. Some may breed confusion and 
resentment. Others may be unintelligible. Still others may disrupt 
a society's basic organizing frameworks in a way that does great 
harm and little good. Outsiders - and insiders too - will often 
know too little, and both must be careful about introducing legal 
99. The high-water mark of the anticaste understanding was probably Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 {1967), with its reference to "White Supremacy." 388 U.S. at 11. The triumph of 
the antidifferentiation idea can be found in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 {1976), and 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
100. For present purposes I do not discuss the possibility that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause would be a better source of the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
101. See RosENBERG, supra note 48, at 336-43 (arguing that courts alone can do little in 
the way of social reform). 
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principles that do not cohere with cultural norms. Context will 
therefore matter a great deal. But these issues concern quite differ-
ent matters from the issue of principle that I am now discussing. 
3. Suspect Classes 
What is the relationship between the anticaste principle and the 
familiar idea that some classifications are "suspect," in the sense 
that the courts will be hostile to discrimination against certain 
groups? We can start by observing that the Supreme Court has 
granted heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate against cer-
tain identifiable groups thought likely to be at particular risk in the 
ordinary political process.102 When the Court grants heightened 
scrutiny, it is highly skeptical of legislation, and the burden of every 
doubt operates on behalf of groups challenging the relevant laws.103 
The difference between the two ideas can be described in the 
following way: The notion of suspect classifications is based on a 
fear that illegitimate considerations are likely to lie behind legisla-
tion, whereas the anticaste principle is designed to ensure against 
second-class status for certain social groups. The two ideas overlap, 
because lower castes may well be subject to legislation grounded on 
illegitimate considerations. But the two ideas are nonetheless dis-
tinct, because illegitimate considerations may lie behind legislation 
discriminating against groups that do not count as lower castes, and 
because the anticaste principle imposes duties on government that 
go well beyond a ban on illegitimately motivated legislation. 
In deciding whether to grant heightened scrutiny, the Court has 
not been altogether clear about its underlying rationale. The Court 
appears to have examined a set of factors - above all, the rele-
vance of the group characteristic to legitimate governmental ends, 
the likelihood that the group in question will be subject to preju-
dice, the immutability of the characteristic, the existence of past and 
102. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 470-72 (applying strict scrutiny to legislation using racial 
distinctions); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985) (refusing to apply 
strict scrutiny to legislation distinguishing the mentally retarded because of the lack of a legal 
tradition disadvantaging this group); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (applying 
heightened scrutiny to legislation using gender distinctions). 
103. I am putting to one side the distinction between "strict scrutiny," used in the racial 
context, and "intermediate scrutiny," used in the context of sex discrimination. An interest-
ing development is the Court's recent suggestion that it has failed to determine whether 
gender classifications are inherently suspect and thus whether intermediate scrutiny or strict 
scrutiny should apply in gender cases, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 
n.6 (1994) (deciding a gender discrimination case without mentioning the difference between 
intermediat~ and strict scrutiny), though it is not clear that there is much difference between 
the two standards. 
2442 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2410 
present discrimination, and the group's lack of political power.104 
In this way, it has moved well beyond the defining case of discrimi-
nation against blacks to include discrimination against women, ille-
gitimate children, and sometimes aliens.1os 
Most of these factors have yet to be fully analyzed. They pur-
port to involve a quasi-factual investigation into real data, but they 
actually depend on controversial and usually unidentified norma-
tive judgments. For example, we cannot know whether a character-
istic is "relevant" just by looking at facts. Often race and sex are 
relevant to employment decisions, in the sense that profits depend 
on them. We cannot know whether a group has historically been 
subject to "discrimination" without knowing whether the unequal 
treatment was justified; discrimination is of course a value-laden 
category. 
Similarly, a major problem with the key issue of political 
powerlessness is that relevant judgments are based not simply on 
facts about political influence. They also depend on some contro-
versial and usually unarticulated claims about how much political 
power is appropriate for the group in question and about the legiti-
macy of the bases for legislative judgments on matters affecting the 
group. The claim that a group is politically weak in the constitu-
tional test is thus a product of controversial and rarely articulated 
claims. 
For example, blacks may have a good deal of political power; 
they can influence elections, even elections of the President. The 
same is true of women, who of course can affect elections a great 
deal. The potentially large electoral influence of both groups does 
not exclude them from the category of groups entitled to particular 
protection against discrimination. The reason is that even if they 
can wield political influence, prejudice in the constitutionally rele-
vant sense is likely to operate against both blacks and women in the 
political process. Blacks may be subject to hatred or devaluation; 
women may be subject to stereotypes about their appropriate role 
that affect their political power and even their own aspirations. The 
conclusion is that the category of political powerlessness looks like 
an inquiry into political science, but it really depends on some judg-
ments about the legitimacy of the usual grounds for government 
action classifying on the basis of race and sex. The real question is 
whether legislation disadvantaging the relevant group is peculiarly 
104. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424-26. 
105. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1978) (women); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365 (1971) (illegitimate children); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (aliens). 
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likely to rest on illegitimate grounds. Heightened scrutiny is a way 
of testing whether it does. 
This discussion should show that the basic features of the 
Court's analysis - the history of discrimination, the category of 
prejudice, the inquiry into whether the relevant characteristic is im-
mutable - can be analyzed in the same way. These ideas are 
designed to help determine if illegitimate considerations typically 
underlie legislation classified 'on the relevant basis. - As noted, a 
judgment that there has been a history of discrimination depends 
on a theory of appropriate distribution, at least of a general sort. 
We rarely say that criminals have suffered a history of discrimina-
tion, and if we do say so, it is not because they are punished for 
criminal conduct. To say that there has been prejudice is to say that 
the usual grounds for discrimination are impermissible, even 
though those grounds may represent good-faith moral convictions. 
Consider, for example, the widely held view that women and men 
should occupy different social roles - a view that, despite its popu-
larity, may not be used to support legislation. Moreover, immuta-
bility is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for suspect 
class status. Blind people are not entitled to the heightened scru-
tiny accorded legislation targeting suspect classes, even though the 
condition of being blind is usually immutable. And if new drugs or 
technology allowed blacks to become whites, or vice versa, and 
made sex-change operations feasible and cheap, would courts aban-
don their careful scrutiny of race and sex discrimination? Surely 
not. 
My major point here is that the anticaste principle is quite dif-
ferent from the antidiscrimination -principle. We might therefore 
think that under current doctrine, discrimination against, for exam-
ple, Asian Americans and Jews should be presumed invalid, with-
out also thinking that Asian Americans and Jews count as lower 
castes. The inquiry into suspect classification is therefore quite dif-
ferent from the inquiry into caste, though the two ideas do overlap. 
4. Discrimination Without Caste? Caste Without Discrimination? 
The above discussion illustrates that many groups that are fre-
quently subject to discrimination do not qualify as lower castes in 
the way I have understood that term. It seems reasonable to think 
that Asian Americans suffer from discrimination and prejudice, but 
it is doubtful that they qualify as a lower caste, because they do not 
appear to be systematically below other groups in terms of the basic 
indicators of social well-being. The same is true for many other 
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groups subject to discrimination, including, for example, homosexu-
als and Jews. Homosexuals are not a lower caste in the sense that 
they are not worse off than heterosexuals in terms of many of the 
usual indicators of social welfare; they cannot show second-class 
citizenship in this sense. But they are also subject to pervasive dis-
crimination and prejudice, with possibly corrosive effects on self-
respect, and in that sense they are subject to social practices con-
nected to the issues of caste that I have been discussing. 
Nothing I have said here is meant to legitimate discrimination 
against groups that have suffered and continue to suffer from pri-
vate and public prejudice. For example, there is indeed an equality 
norm that is offended by discrimination on the basis of religion. 
Though I cannot support the point here, I think the same is true for 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. But the anticaste 
principle does not cover groups simply by virtue of the fact that 
they are often subject to illegitimate discrimination. The anticaste 
principle has special meanings and uses. It does not exhaust the 
several constitutional principles of equality. 
C. Some Data 
As I have understood the matter, the inquiry into caste has a 
large empirical dimension. The principle focuses on whether one 
group is systematically below others along important dimensions of 
social welfare. I offer some relevant information here. Needless to 
say, the account is far from complete. Throughout this discussion it 
will be useful to recall that about twelve percent of Americans are 
black. 
It is not surprising to find dramatic disparities between whites 
and blacks along nearly all dimensions of social well-being. Begin 
with economic measures. The per capita income of whites is nearly 
double that of blacks. The median income of white households is 
$37,783, as compared to $21,548 for black households.106 Nearly 
one-third of black Americans live below the poverty level, com-
pared to about one-tenth of white Americans.107 Ten percent of 
whites over sixty-five live below the poverty line, as compared to 
about a third of blacks.108 Perhaps worst of all, 45% of black chil-
dren live below the poverty line, as compared to 16% of white chil-
106. BUREAU OF TiiE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
TIIE UNITED STATES 1993, at 467 tbl. 732, 462 tbl. 721 (113th ed. 1993) [hereinafter STATISTI· 
CAL ABSTRACT). 
107. Id. at 471 tbl. 740. 
108. Id. at 470 tbl. 739. 
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dren.109 About a quarter of black households earn less than 
$10,000 per year, compared to fewer than 10% of white 
households.11° 
There are also striking disparities with respect to unemployment 
levels. In 1992, 6.5% of whites were unemployed, as compared to 
14.1 % of blacks.111 Disparities of this sort persist over time. Con-
sider the chart on the following pages: 
109. Id. at 469 tbl. 736. 
110. Id. at 464 tbl. 725. 
111. Id. at 413 tbl. 652. 
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1988 5.5 4.7 4.7 13.9 4.1 4.7 12.3 4.1 11.7 11.7 32.7 10.1 11.7 32.0 10.4 
1989 5.3 4.5 4.5 13.7 3.9 4.5 11.5 4.0 11.4 11.5 31.9 10.0 11.4 33.0 9.8 
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We might tum to education, longevity, and crime. Over 80% of 
whites have completed high school, while about two-thirds of blacks 
have their high school diplomas.113 About 23 % of whites have 
completed a college degree, as compared to about 13% of blacks.114 
The life expectancy of a white American is four years longer than 
the life expectancy of a black American.115 From 1970 to 1990, 
about ten people per 100,000 were murdered each year.116 During 
this same period, the annual murder rate for white men ranged 
from seven to ten per 100,000, compared to a range of fifty to eighty 
for black men.117 Similarly, the murder rate for white women was 
between two and three per 100,000, compared to ten to fifteen for 
black women.118 In 1991, thirty whites out of a thousand were sub-
ject to a crime against their person, down from thirty-two in 1973, 
but forty-four blacks out of a thousand were subject to such a 
crime, up from forty-two in 1973.119 
Consider political representation. Of the 435 members of the 
House of Representatives, only forty are black. In the Senate, the 
numbers are even more striking: of the one hundred senators, only 
one is black.120 There are also inequalities in political participation. 
About 70% of white people were registered to vote, as compared to 
64% of blacks, in the 1992 elections. There are slightly higher dis-
parities for voting itself, showing about a 10% differential in the last 
presidential election.121 
With respect to sex inequality, most of the numbers are far less 
dramatic. Women's life expectancy is higher than that of men.122 
The educational attainment of men and women is about the same, 
especially in light of changes over the past twenty years - though 
white men are significantly more likely to be college graduates than 
white women.123 Most of the disparities between men and women 
involve income, wealth, and political representation. 
113. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 106, at 153 tbl. 232. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 85 tbl. 115. 
116. Id. at 94 tbl. 129. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 197 tbl. 309. 
120. Telephone Conversation with the Office of the Congressional Black Caucus (Sept. 1, 
1994). 
121. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 106, at 283 tbl. 454. 
122. Id. at 85 tbl. 116. 
123. Id. at 153 tbl. 231. 
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The basic economic indicators show large differences. About 
69.3% of women are in the labor force, as compared to 88.9% of 
men. The median yearly earnings of women is $24,000, compared 
to $35,850 for men. At every stage of educational attainment, men 
out-earn women by a substantial margin. The average annual in-
come of a woman high school graduate is about $19,000; for a man, 
the average is about $28,000. For a woman with some college edu-
cation, the annual figure is over $22,000, as compared to over 
$33,000 for a man. For a woman who has at least a bachelor's de-
gree, the annual figure is about $33,000, as compared to over 
$50,000 for a man.124 
The poverty rate for single-mother families is 59%.125 Note in 
this regard that 15,396 children under eighteen live only with their 
mother, compared to the 2182 who live with their father only.126 
And after divorce, the average standard of living of men increases 
by 42%, whereas that of women decreases by 73%.127 There are 
388 male representatives in the House of Representatives and 
forty-eight women.128 Of one hundred senators, only seven are 
women.129 
This is merely a brief collection of information showing group-
based disparities that bear on the question of second-class citizen-
ship. As we will soon see, the information suggests a need to shift 
from judicial to legislative forums - and also, ironically, to use 
race- and gender-neutral remedies. 
III. THE FUTURE 
A. From Antidiscrimination to Anticaste 
Equality law has had two principal stages. The first was con-
cerned with preventing explicit discrimination, public or private, 
against blacks and women. This included the attack on American 
apartheid, led by Thurgood Marshall and culminating in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 130 and also the attack on explicit sex discrimi-
nation, led by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.131 The legal assault on public 
124. Id. at 394 tbl. 624, 467 tbl. 731. 
125. Id. at 470 tbl. 737. 
126. Id. at 63 tbl. 79. 
127. OKIN, supra note 18, at 161. These are contested figures, though the claim of a 
general disparity is uncontroversial. 
128. 1994 CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY at xix-xx.vi {Ann L. Brownson ed., 1994). 
129. Id. at xvii-xviii. 
130. 347 U.S. 483 {1954). 
131. See, e.g., Califano v. <,}oldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
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discrimination was eventually matched by the statutory attack on 
private discrimination.132 The second stage consisted of challenges 
to public and private practices that did not involve explicit discrimi-
nation but that stemmed from prejudice or that otherwise had large 
and not adequately justified discriminatory effects.133 This second 
stage built on ~h~ first. Neither has entirely run its course. 
Both of these movements for reform had substantial success, 
certainly in eliminating the most conspicuously unsupportable pub-
lic and private practices. Both were connected with anticaste goals, 
and to the extent that they operated within the judiciary, they were 
also well adapted to the limited institutional capacities of the judici-
ary.134 On the other hand, the successes, important as they have 
been, have had ambiguous effects on the inequalities discussed 
above. From what has been said thus far, it should be clear that if 
the elimination of second-class citizenship is an important social 
goal, it would be valuable to start in new directions, some of which 
have not typically been associated with civil rights at all. 
If opposition to caste is a basic goal, civil rights policy should 
concern itself first and foremost with such problems as lack of op-
portunities for education, training, and employment; inadequate 
housing, food, and health care; vulnerability to crime, both public 
and private; incentives to participate in crime; disproportionate sub-
jection to environmental hazards; and teenage pregnancy and 
single-parent families. Policies of this kind suggest a major shift in 
direction from the more narrowly focused antidiscrimination poli-
cies of the past. 
This is hardly the place for a full program for legislative reform. 
But in resolving current problems, most of the traditional claims of 
civil rights law provide incomplete help. The problem is not rooted 
in explicitly race- or sex-based classification, nor does it lie in preju-
dice, at least not in any simple sense.135 It lies instead in policies 
and programs that contribute to second-class status, often in ex-
132. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 
(codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
133. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. Vll, 
78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 
& Supp. III 1991)). 
134. But see RosENBERG, supra note 48, at 169, 226-27 (arguing that the Court has been 
unable to improve the Jot of women or blacks and that any progress achieved by these two 
groups usually resulted from extrajudicial forces). 
135. The problem may well lie in a form of selective racial empathy and indifference, but 
this notion is hard to administer, for reasons well discussed in Strauss, supra note 38, at 939, 
988-90. 
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tremely complex ways involving interactions between past practices 
and a wide array of current policies.136 
In proposing reforms, we might look quite eclectically at a range 
of protections against the sorts of disparities discussed above. For 
example, policies promoting economic growth are an important 
part of equality law insofar as growth is associated with employ-
ment and the reduction of poverty. But because the association is 
imperfect,137 many other steps are necessary. I simply note a few 
possibilities here; of course a range of details would be required in 
order to assess any of them. 
Targeted educational policies, including efforts to promote liter-
acy and Head Start programs, provide promising models.138 At 
least partial successes have resulted from parental leave and "flex-
time" policies.139 Certainly, employment-related policies are im-
portant insofar as job increases are closely connected with the re-
duction of poverty. In the area of voting rights law, the race-neutral 
remedy of cumulative voting might be preferable to racially explicit 
approaches.14° Consider as well recent initiatives designed to re-
duce violence generally and violence against women in particular 
- through education, additional government resources for crime 
prevention and punishment, and new legal remedies for victims of 
sex-related violence.141 We might compare these with President 
Clinton's recent executive order on environmental justice, designed 
to prevent disproportionate health and safety effects from the exist-
ence of environmental hazards.142 
136. A model discussion is CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS (1994) (tracing the 
causes of increased homelessness to a variety of indifferent or well-intentioned governmental 
and social actions, such as the destruction of skid row housing and the deinstitutionalization 
of the mentally ill). 
137. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1307-08 (arguing that the productivity gains leading 
to economic growth can actually fail to help the poor). 
138. See Laura A. Miller, Head Start: A Moving Target, 5 YALE L. & PoLY. REv. 322 
(1987) (portraying Head Start as one of the clear success stories of the Great Society). 
139. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal 
Thought in the 1970's, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9. 
140. See LANI Gu1N1ER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 149 (1994); Richard H. Pildes, 
Gimme Five, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 16. 
141. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 
1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
142. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). 
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Of course there are limits to how much legal reform can do to 
redress these problems, at least in the short run. But there is much 
that law can do to help.143 
B. Against Race Consciousness 
On the account I have offered, there is no constitutional objec-
tion to genuinely remedial race- and sex-conscious policies, at least 
as a general rule.144 If a basic goal is opposition to caste, affirma-
tive action policies are ordinarily permissible. Partly this lesson 
stems from the history of the Civil War Amendments; if history is 
relevant, it is hard to support the view that affirmative action pro-
grams are invalid.145 But partly it is a lesson of logic. We have seen 
that in an important way the antidiscrimination principle is continu-
ous with the affirmative action principle. Insofar as statistical dis-
crimination is outlawed, the government has singled out one form 
of rational categorization and subjected it to special disability. At 
least along this dimension, the antidiscrimination principle partakes 
of an affirmative action principle. 
To be sure, it may be possible to generalize from the Civil War 
Amendments a general opposition to the use of skin color as a basis 
for the distribution of social benefits and burdens. Perhaps we 
should say that government ought never or rarely to consider skin 
color in its official decisions, because use of skin color has bad edu-
cational and expressive effects, and because it legitimates the view 
that people should see each other, and themselves, in racial terms. 
But this view is historically adventurous,146 and it would also in-
volve a highly intrusive role for the courts. Race-conscious pro .. 
grams occupy an exceptionally wide range. They can be found in 
143. See, e.g., CASS N. SuNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 77-81 (1990); 
Donohue, supra note 94 (arguing that employment discrimination laws successfully reduced 
discrimination); Miller, supra note 138 (describing the successes of the Head Start program). 
144. A qualification is necessary here. Many race- and sex-conscious programs may be 
only pretextually remedial, especially in the gender context, in which purportedly remedial 
measures may in fact be discriminatory. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 
(1975) (striking down a social security law giving benefits to women but not to men because 
the provision actually reflected irrational gender stereotypes). Also, some approaches might 
be too crudely connected with remedial goals, see, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commn., 497 U.S. 547 (1991) (upholding a race-conscious approach despite 
its crudeness), or perhaps with rigid quotas, see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
145. See Schnapper, supra note 89, at 789-98 (arguing that history does not support oppo-
sition to affirmative action programs). 
146. See id. at 797-98 (arguing that courts categorically condemning "benign racial dis-
tinctions" such as affirmative action programs ignore the 130-year-old intentions expressed 
by Congress in the Freedmen's Bureau Act). 
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education, employment, licensing, and elsewhere.147 They have 
been accepted at local, state, and federal levels and by courts, ad-
ministrators, presidents, and legislatures;148 they have come from 
people whose views sharply diverge, including conservatives and 
liberals alike - both Democrats and Republicans have supported 
them.149 In these circumstances, judges should be extremely reluc-
tant to say that there is anything like a fiat ban on race-conscious 
programs. 
It might be concluded that race- and sex-conscious remedial pol-
icies are not merely unobjectionable but even mandatory under an 
anticaste principle. Perhaps such policies are necessary in order to 
counteract second-class status; certainly many people have so 
thought. But such policies have a mixed record, and in some places 
and ways, they have been a conspicuous failure. Some platitudes 
are worth repeating: In some places, race-conscious judgments 
have stigmatized their purported beneficiaries, by making people 
think that blacks are present only because of their skin color. In 
some places, such judgments have fueled hostility and increased 
feelings of second-class citizenship. Some people who would do ex-
tremely well in some good institutions - schools or jobs - are 
placed by affirmative action in programs or positions in which they 
perform far less well, with harmful consequences for their self-
respect. Ironically, affirmative action programs can aggravate 
problems of caste by increasing the social perception that a highly 
visible feature like skin color is associated with undesirable 
characteristics. 
In part the failures have stemmed from resistance to any reme-
dies at all for the legacy of discrimination, and it would be wrong to 
discount the extent to which opposition to affirmative action can 
stem from opposition to any change in the status quo. But in part 
the failure has stemmed from a general conviction that skin color 
and gender should not matter to social outcomes. In view of both 
history and principle, that conviction should not be discounted or 
147. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (busing to desegregate Georgia 
schools); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commn., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) 
(minority preferences for broadcast licenses); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986) (layoffs allocated partly by race). 
148. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (local construc-
tion set-aside program); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (congressional set-aside 
program in construction grants); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
(state-level university admission program). 
149. See 448 U.S. at 461-62 & n.38 (citing 123 CoNo. REC. 12,941-43, 13,242-57 (1977)) 
(discussing ~he overwhelming passage of the minority business enterprises program at issue 
in Fullilove by both the Senate and the House). 
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trivialized. It is relevant in this regard that many defenses of affirm-
ative action programs are hard to offer in public. Often the nature 
of affirmative action programs is not discussed publicly because to 
do so would be humiliating to the supposed beneficiaries or intoler-
able to the public at large. 
Perhaps this is partly a product of the unfortunate rhetoric of 
affirmative action.150 But partly it is a result of a deep-seated resist-
ance to "racialism" as producing frequent unfairness in individual 
cases and as inconsistent with widespread convictions about the re-
lationship between individual achievement and social reward. 
Elaborate arguments might be and have been offered to try to un-
dermine this resistance and these convictions.151 But it is at least 
revealing that sometimes these arguments seem too elaborate to 
carry much weight before the very people to whom they are aimed. 
I do not mean to say that all or most affirmative action pro-
grams should be abolished. There is too much variety to allow for 
sensible global judgments. But we know enough to know that such 
programs have often failed and that race-neutral alternatives are 
often better. 
These considerations suggest both a presumption in favor of 
race- and gender-neutral policies and the need to develop legal re-
forms that are not gender- or race-conscious - that do not give rise 
to widespread fears that government is playing favorites or is sub-
ject to the lobbying pressure of well-organized private groups. And 
it would be possible to administer an anticaste principle in race- and 
gender-neutral terms. We can think of many examples, inducting 
broad-based anticrime and antidrug measures; literacy and educa-
tional programs; policies designed to protect children from poor 
health and from poverty, including neonatal care and childhood im-
munizations;152 and programs designed to discourage teen preg-
nancy and single-parent families. Policies of this kind could easily 
be designed in race- and sex-neutral terms, and such policies would 
be directed against many of the important problems faced by both 
blacks and women. 
150. See Margaret J. Radin, Affirmative Action Rhetoric, in REASSESSING C1v1L RIGHTS 
130, 136-38 (Ellen Paul et al. eds., 1991); see also Thomas Hill, The Message of Affirmative 
Action, in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at 108. 
151. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 19 (arguing that antidiscrimination and' affirmative ac-
tion are indistinguishable in principle). 
152. Note the enormous disparity between infant mortality rates for blacks and the corre-
sponding rates for whites. See Gaps in Infant Mortality Rate Still Widening Between Blacks, 
Whites, CHI. TRJB., Apr. 30, 1994, at 19. 
August 1994] The Anticaste Principle 2455 
These are some of the directions in which equality law might 
move in the future. It is ironic but true that a third stage of civil 
rights policy, directed most self-consciously against race and gender 
caste, might also be self-consciously designed - for reasons of pol-
icy and principle - so as to avoid race- and gender-specificity. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay I have criticized three approaches to the problem 
of race and sex equality in law. Free markets can accomplish con-
siderable good in the area of equality as everywhere else, but they 
are only a mixed blessing for race and sex equality. Reliance on 
existing preferences has related problems, at least to the extent that 
those preferences are an artifact of an unjust status quo. The no-
tion that the law forbids unreasonable distinctions is purely formal. 
As often interpreted, the idea has substance behind it, and perhaps 
it is well suited to the institutional limits of the judiciary. But the 
substance is not simple to defend. It sometimes requires identical 
treatment in cases in which distinctions make sense, and ignores 
inequality when inequality is present. Sometimes the cause of 
equality requires people who are differently situated to be treated 
differently, and this is a major gap in constitutional doctrine. 
I have suggested that one of the prevailing constitutional norms 
ought to be an anticaste principle, one that forbids social and legal 
practices from turning highly visible but morally irrelevant differ-
ences into a basis for second-class citizenship. I have also sought to 
show realms in which a system with castelike features persists in 
modern American society; this is an area in which a good deal of 
information is indispensable. Partly for this reason, the anticaste 
principle is mostly for legislative rather than judicial enforcement. 
Courts lack the requisite fact-finding capacity and electoral legiti-
macy. But this does not mean that others, prominently including 
Congress, are relieved of an important and even constitutional 
duty, violated by widespread current practices, to eliminate the 
castelike features of American society. 
